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ABSTRACT This paper reports on an open-ended Contingent Valuation Method study of
the conservation bene ® ts of Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESA s) in Scotland. The
ESA scheme is a central component of agri-environmental policy in the UK, and an
interesting policy question concerns the extent of non-market bene ® ts generated by such
ESAs. The econometric issues we raise in this paper revolve around bid curves. Bid
curves are estimated in open-ended Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) studies for
three reasons. These are: (1) as a test of theoretical validity; (2) as a test of discriminant
validity; and (3) as a means of bene ® ts transfer. W ithin the ® rst and last of these aims,
the partial relationship between willingness to pay (WTP) and independent variables
such as income is of interest. There are several econometric issues involved in estimating
such relationships, First, the selection process implicit in obtaining positive WTP bids
should be explicitly modelled. Second, many CVM surveys suffer from item non-re-
sponse with respect to `sensitive’ questions such as the respondent’s income; these
non-responses may be non-random in nature. Finally, it is possible to dis-aggregate the
effect of marginal changes in, say, income on WTP into two elements, namely: an effect
on the probability that the individual will be w illing to pay something; and secondly, an
effect on how much they are willing to pay.
Introduction
Since the structural reforms of 1985, the Common Agricultural Policy has placed
increasing emphasis on targeting payments to farmers away from food pro-
duction related payments, and towards area payments and direct income
support. Payments for environmental goods produced by the farm sector from
European Union (EU) agricultural ministry budgets ® rst became possible in


























24 B. A lvarez-Farizoet al.
1985, and the UK adopted its Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESA) scheme
two years later. Agri-environmental policies such as the ESA scheme can
now be found in many EU countries (for a survey, see OECD, 1996), and may
be justi® ed on a number of grounds: that they pay farmers to produce
environmental public goods which would otherwise be under-supplied from
the poin t of view of economic ef ® ciency (Hanley et al., 1998a); and/or that they
offer a means of supporting farm incomes without increasing food production,
and thus adding to the costs of disposing of excess supplies at the EU level.
Given that these schemes are costly, though, both in terms of foregone output
and exchequer costs, attention has recently been directed at measuring the
economic value of the environmental bene ® ts of such policies (W illis et al.,
1993).
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is now one of the most common
valuation methods in use in both Europe and the USA. Willingne ss to pay
(WTP) amounts can be estimated using a number of different designs in CVM,
the most common of which are open-ended (OE) and dichotomous choice (DC).
DC designs are known, on the whole, to result in higher mean WTP values than
OE designs. Brown et al. (1996) summarize results from 11 CVM surveys which
compared formats and found that, in all cases, DC mean WTP exceeded OE
mean WTP, with the ratio of DC/OE varying from 1.12 to 4.78. This difference
is partly due to the phenomenon of `yea-saying ’, and partly due to preference
uncertainty (Ready et al., 1996; Brown et al., 1996). Evidence from Loomis (1990)
suggests that OE designs outperform DC on temporal stability grounds, whilst
Brown et al. (1996) found that DC designs resulted in a greater hypothetical
market error (in other words, resulted in a greater difference between stated and
actual WTP) than an OE equivalent. There are thus grounds for preferring OE
to DC designs, as offering a more conservative design of survey. In contrast,
familiar claims are that DC designs are more realistic, are easier for respondents
to answer, and are incentive-compatible (Hoehn & Randall, 1987). The `trump
card’ usually played by proponents of DC designs is that the NOAA
1
panel
recommended a DC design , although this con¯ icts with another of their recom-
mendations, that of conservative survey design choices. Accordingly, the empiri-
cal study on which this paper is based used both DC and OE designs for CVM.
This paper reports on the outcome of the OE study, and comments on some
econometric issues raised by this design. We report elsewhere on the DC study,
and on a choice experiment application to the same case studies (Hanley et al.,
1998b).
An important part of the OE CVM exercise is the estimation of bid curves. Bid
curves (that is, a statistical relationship between WTP and variables thought to
in¯ uence its magnitude) are usually estimated for three reasons. The ® rst is as
a test of theoretical validity, which involves checking whether signs on explana-
tory variables (such as income) are in accord with a priori expectations. The
second is as a test of discrim inant validity, by checking whether bids are simply
random numbers, or can be explained statistically to a satisfactory level using
variations in other variables collected as part of the survey (such as age, income
and education). `Satisfactory’ is usually de® ned either with respect to R
2
values
found in other published CV studies, or Mitchell & Carson’s benchmark of 15%.
The third is as a means of facilitating bene ® ts transfer (Bergland et al., 1995;
Willis & Garrod, 1995; Foundation for Water Research, 1996). If WTP estimates


























Estimating the Bene ® ts of Agri-environmentalPolicy 25
`study’ site to represent values at a second `policy’ site . Transferring unadjusted
WTP values is also possible.
With respect to the ® rst and last of these reasons, a main feature of interest is
the estimated impact of certain independent variables on an individual’s WTP
for a given environmental good or service. For example, WTP for environmental
bene® ts is typically an increasing function of household income. The income
elasticity of WTP has been estimated at values typically falling in the 1 0.5 to
1 0.75 range (Brisson , 1996). Finding intuitively and/or theoretically correct
signs on variables such as income in the bid curve is one test for the validity of
CVM results. Estimating the correct magnitude of partial effects of independent
variables on WTP is important for bene ® ts transfer and for other policy ques-
tions.
The purpose of this paper is to report on estimates of WTP for the environ-
mental bene® ts of one element of UK agri-environmental policy, namely ESAs,
and in the process to consider some econometric modelling issues in the
estimation of bid curves. We concentrate on a sample-selection approach to do
this, whereby we seek to distinguish different decisions which a potential CVM
survey respondent must take in formulating a WTP bid. These decisions are
whether to protest, whether to give a positive bid and how much to bid. This
modelling approach allows us to `decompose’ the marginal effects of one
independent variable on WTP into separable effects on these different stages,
using a procedure ® rst outlined by McDonald & Mof® tt (1980).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
outline the nature of WTP bids, and show brie¯ y how `self-selection’ can create
econometric problems in bid curve estimation. We also note some problems
regarding incomplete responses, primarily with respect to income. In the third
section, the main relevant features of the ESA scheme, and the two case study
sites , are outlined . In the fourth section, we give details on the design and
descriptive results from the CVM survey. The ® fth section comments on the
results obtained from a number of bid curve models, whilst a ® nal section offers
some conclusions.
Econometric Issues
The basic idea behind the estimation of bid curves is to relate a measure of
willingness to pay, p , for an environmental change to a set of explanatory
factors. That is:
p 5 f (X ) (1)
where : X 5 X1, X2, ¼ , X k is a vector of variables thought to in¯ uence the amount
an individual is willing to pay to bene ® t from a certain environmental improve-
ment or to avoid a certain environmental degradation. It is common to estimate
this relationship as a linear regression equation of the form using an (assumed)
random sample of individuals:
(2)p 5 b 9 X 1 «
where : b is a vector of unknown parameters and « is a random error term
assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean and constant variance. The
estimated parameters of this relationship are important; their signs indicate the


























26 B. A lvarez-Farizoet al.
indicate the strength or magnitude of these associations. That is, for variables
that are continuous in measurement:
b k 5 ­ p/ ­ X k (3)
where : ­ p/ ­ X k is the partial derivative of p with respect X k, which represen ts an
estimate of the effect of a change in a given explanatory variable on willingness
to pay holding constant the effect of the other variables included in the equation.
Despite the empirical simplicity of equation (2), there are two problems that
emerge in practise when estimating bid curves in such a manner. The ® rst is that
in most CVM studies a signi® cant proportion of respondents usually report `zero
bids’ . The second is that there is often a substantial amount of missing infor-
mation on some of the explanatory variables. As is argued below, the way these
two issues are treated empirically may be problematic and casts some doubt on
the validity of the parameter estimates of WTP equations of the type described
in equation (2).
Zero bid responses to open-ended willingness to pay questions may be
categorized into one of three types. The ® rst are `genuine zero bids’ where the
respondent indicates that she is not willing to pay anything for the good or
service in question, because she does not value it. The second are `protest bids’ ,
where the respondent tenders a zero bid for reasons other than placing a zero
value (i.e. not being willing to pay anything) on the good in question. This may
be, for example, because she disapproves of the principle of paying for environ-
mental protection since she believes it should be required by law. The third are
`don’ t know’ responses, where the individual is simply uncertain as to the
amount she is willing to pay (this amount of course may also be zero).
The fact that these `zero bids’ do not necessarily mean that an individual is
unwilling to pay anything has led to ad hoc estimation practises. In many WTP
studies, individuals who report zero bids are excluded and equation (2) is
estimated only for individuals who tender positive bids. Or, equation (2) is
estimated for individuals who report positive bids and genuine zero bids, with
individuals who tender protest bids or who give `don’ t know’ responses being
excluded. Both these strategies are problematic since the willingness to pay
equation is estimated on what may termed a `self-selected sample’ Ð a form of
sample selection bias.
The second problem mentioned above relates to the treatment of individuals
for whom some information is missing in the data set for a sub-set of explana-
tory variables. It is genera lly believed (for obvious economic reasons) that
income is one of the key variables in explaining differences across individuals in
their willingness to pay for goods and services. Income is also one of the
questions that individuals tend to be reluctant to answer, and in practise this
reluctance leads to a signi® cant item non-response rates for income questions in
CVM surveys. For example, in the two surveys that we carried out (discussed
below), 11.3% and 19.6% of individuals surveyed did not give responses to the
income question. In the estimation of bid curves it is common to exclude those
individuals who do not respond to the questions used to construct the variables
that are included in X in equation (2). This strategy would not be problematic
if those individuals who do not report such information are a random sub-sam-
ple of all individuals surveyed . However, this is unlikely to be the case for
`sensitive’ variables such as income. For example, it is well known that individ-
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surveys (i.e. have a higher non-response rate). If individuals who have higher
income have a higher (or for that matter lower) willingness to pay, excluding
individuals with missing income information from the estimation of equation (2)
will lead to a biased estimate of the effect of income on willingness to pay (and
biased estimates of the parameters of the other variables). In other words,
missing information on the explanatory variables of interest may result in the
estimation of willingness to pay equations with samples whose values on
explanatory variables do not re¯ ect those of the population of interest, a further
source of sample selection bias. Several methods have developed for addressing
such biases.
In order to demonstrate the problem that results from sample selection bias
more formally, let j 5 1, 2,¼ , J denote individuals who report a `valid ’ willing-
ness to pay (i.e. p $ 0); let k 5 1, 2, ¼ , K denote individuals who do not report
a valid willingness to pay (i.e. protest bids and `don’t know’ responses); and let
i 5 1, 2, 3, ¼ , N where N 5 J 1 K . The population regress ion equation of the
willingness to pay equation is the expectation of equation (2):
(4)E(p i/X i ) 5 b 9 X i
(Note the subscript i). However, because of protest bids and `don’t know’
responses, observations on p are only available for a sub-sample of N That is,
only for p $ 0 or sample J. In other words, the regression equation for the
`selected’ sample is the expectation:
E(pj/X j, selected sample) 5 b 9 X j 1 E( « j, selected sample) (5)
(Note the subscript j). If the conditional expectation of « j is zero, then the
regression equation for the selected sample (i.e. equation (5)) will be the same as
the population regression equation (i.e. equation (4)). In this case, ordinary least
squares (OLS) may be used to generate an unbiased estimate of the parameter
vector b using only observations from the selected (J) sample. If, however, the
sample selection process is non-random, equation (4) will not be the same as
equation (5). The reason is, simply, that the mean of the error term will not be
zero (i.e. E( « j) Þ 0) and the estimates of b will be consequently biased.
Heckman (1976, 1979) has recast the problem of sample selection bias as an
omitted variable problem and has proposed what is an extremely popular
econometric correction. Heckman’s econometric procedure essentially involves
modelling the sample selection mechanism and then using these estimates to
`purge ’ the equation of interest of degrading selection effects (i.e. the equation
estimated on the selected sample).
In order to demonstrate Heckman’s method in the context of estimating a bid
curve, let zi* be a latent variable that determines whether or not an individual
gives a valid willingness to pay response (i.e. p $ 0). This latent variable may be
related to a set of explanatory factors as a linear equation of the form:
(6)zi* 5 a 9 Z i 1 m i
where : Z i 5 Z1, Z2, ¼ , Z r is a vector of variables thought to in¯ uence whether or
not an individual bids p $ 0; a is a set of unknown parameters to be estimated;
and m i is assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean and constant
variance. In this model zi* is not observed. What is observed is an indicator
variable, zi, that takes on a value of 1 if p i $ 0 and value of 0 if not. Based on
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in the sample that is used to estimate the willingness to pay equation. If z i* . 0
then z i 5 1 and p is observed (i.e. p $ 0). If on the other hand, zi* # 0 then z i 5 0
and p is not observed (e.g. protest bid). Estimates of equation (6) are used to
construct the inverse of the Mill’ s ratio, often referred to as `Heckman’s l ’ :
(7)l j 5 Á ( 2 a 9 Z j)/[1 2 F ( a 9 Z j)]
where Á (.) is the standard normal density function (pdf) and F (.) is the standard
normal cumulative density function (cdf). This `new’ variable is then included in
the willingne ss to pay equation Ð the `structural equation’ Ð as an additional
regressor:
pj 5 b 9 X j 1 g l j 1 « j* (8)
where g is the covariance between the error terms in the selection equation and
willingness to pay equation. Equation (8) should provide an unbiased estimate
of b if the selection process is adequately modelled (i.e. the selection equation is
properly speci® ed).
Although Heckman’ s two-step procedure can be used as a possible control for
selection bias, it ignores the fact that the willingness to pay variable p is a
`censored’ dependent variable. The censoring problem with respect to estimation
of willingness to pay equations has two dimensions. The ® rst is that there is a
real lower bound Ð it is typically not possible to bid less than zero. The second
is that there is often `heaping’ on the lower bound Ð often a signi® cant pro-
portion of individuals make zero bids. For example, in the two surveys that we
carried out (discussed below), 36.8% and 46.6% of individuals made zero bids.
Failure to account for the concentration of observations at the limit value can
result in misleading estimates of the parameters of the explanatory variables of
interest (e.g. parameters estimated using OLS).
Ignoring the sample selection issue for the moment, Tobin (1958) argued that
it is useful to think of explanatory variables in¯ uencing both the probability of
the limit response and the size of the non-limit response. More speci® cally in
terms of the willingness -to-pay decision, the ® rst is the impact of explanatory
variables on the probability of making a positive bid and the second is the
impact on the amount bid. More formally:
(9)pi* 5 b 9 X 1 «
where : pi* is an unobserved latent variable underlying p ; and « is an error term
with the usual properties. Let L i be the lower limit (e.g. in the case of willingness
to pay the lower limit is zero). If pi* # L i then p i 5 L i, and the observation is
censored at the lower limit (i.e. pi 5 0). If on the other hand, p i* $ L i then p i 5 p i*
( 5 b 9 X 1 « ), and p i is observed. Therefore, the expected value of p is :
E(p) 5 Prob(p . 0) 3 E(p/p . 0) (10)
where the ® rst term on the right-hand side is the probability that p is positive and
the second term is the expected value of p given that p is some positive value.
In terms of the regression notation used above this expectation may be
expressed as:
(11)E(p) 5 F ( b 9 X/ s « ) 3 ( b 9 X/ s « 1 s « l « )
with:
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where : s « is a scale parameter. The parameters of equation (11) can be easily
estimated using maximum likelihood techniques (see Greene, 1993, for details) .
Unfortunately the parameters of the Tobit model are more dif ® cult to
interpret than in the case of a simple linear regression. They do not (as some
have unfortunately assumed) represent the effect of a change in a given
explanatory variable on the dependent variable of interest (i.e. ­ p/ ­ X k). Mc-
Donald & Mof® tt (1980) demonstrate that an informative way to present the
results of a Tobit regression is to decompose the effect of an explanatory
variable (or a series of explanatory variables) into two components. The ® rst is
the impact on the probability of being above the lim it and the second is the
impact on the dependent variable if it is already above the limit. More
formally:
(12)­ E(p)/ ­ Xk 5 [ F ( b 9 X/ s « )] 3 [ ­ E(p*)/ ­ Xk] 1 E(p*) 3 ­ [ F ( b 9 X/ s « )]/ ­ Xk
where E(p*) is the expected value of p conditional on being above the limit and
all other terms have been de® ned above. In terms of the willingness to pay
problem, the ® rst term on the right-hand side of equation (12) is the impact of
the explanatory variable on the probability of a positive bid and the second term
is the impact on the amount bid (conditional on a positive bid in the ® rst place).
Therefore, the relative magnitudes of these two components is of substantive
importance.
The extension of the Tobit model to include sample selection is straightfor-
ward. The expected value of the Tobit model with selection is:
(13)E(p u z 5 1) 5 Prob(p . 0,z 5 1) 3 E(p u p . 0,z, 5 1)
where as above z is an indicator variable that equals 1 if p is observed and 0 if
not. The probability that p . 0 and z 5 1 is:
Prob(p . 0,z 5 1) 5 F 2( b 9 X/ s « , a 9 Z, r ) (14)
where : F 2 is the bivariate normal probability distribution and r is the covariance
between the error terms in the selection equation (i.e. equation (6)) and the error
term in the structural Tobit equation (i.e. equation (9)). The expected value of p
given that p . 0 and z 5 1 is:
(15)E(p u p . 0, z 5 1) 5 b 9 X 1 E( « u « . 2 b 9 X, m . 2 a 9 Z)
The corresponding Tobit-like expression for the selected sample (analogous to
equation (9)) is the product of equation (14) and equation (15). After some
manipulation this express ion may be written :
(16)E(p u z 5 1) 5 F 2( b 9 X 1 s « { Á (h) F [ d (k 2 r h)] 1 r Á (k) F [ d (h 2 r k)]}]
where h 5 2 b 9 X/ s « ; k 5 2 a 9 Z; and d 5 2 1/(1 2 r 2) 2 2. Unlike Heckman’s two-
step procedure, the selection equation and structural equation are estimated jointly
by the method of maximum likelihood (see Greene , 1993, for estimation details) .
It is straightforward to adapt the Tobit model with selection to include
information on explanatory variables of central theoretical importance that have
missing information, such as income, in the estimation of bid curves. In order to
do this, one has to specify the selection mechanism in a sligh tly different way.
More speci® cally , the selection mechanism when income reporting is ignored is
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tendered, compared to a protest bid when all individuals with missing income
information are excluded from the estimation. However, the selection mechan-
ism when income non-reported is included in the estimation is a model of the
joint probability that a valid bid is tendered and income is reported.
The use of the Tobit estimator to obtain bid curves is, of course, not uncom-
mon in open-ended CVM studies, since this approach recognizes the censored
nature of WTP values (see, for example, Hanley & Craig, 1991; Kaoru, 1993).
However, the modelling of sample selection is far less common. The only
example the authors are aware of is Kaoru (1993) who includes a Heckman-type
selection equation in his estimation of WTP for water quality bene ® ts in the
Martha’s Vineyard area of New England. Of 559 mailed out questionnaires, 200
were returned with complete socio-economic information. Of these 200 re-
sponses, 25 gave a zero WTP value and 30 responses were protest bids. Kaoru
estimates a selection equation comparing positive WTP bids with (zero plus
protest) bids. However, only income was signi® cant in the selection equation,
whilst the coef® cient on the inverse Mills was insigni® cant. Kaoru does not
model income non-responses, nor does he employ the McDonald/Mof® tt de-
composition. His approach is therefore very different to ours.
Agri-environmental Policy and the Case Study Areas
The data used in this paper relate to a contingent valuation study of two
Environmentally Sensitive Areas in Scotland, carried out on behalf of the
Scottish Of® ce during 1994± 96 (for full details, see Hanley et al., 1996). ESAs
were established under Article 19 of EC Structures Regulation 797/85 in 1985, as
part of the early reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. They are designated
areas of the country which are of special landscape and/or conservation interest
where traditional farming methods are considered to be essential to maintaining
wildlife and landscape quality.
In Scotland, 10 ESAs have been designated since 1987, covering some 1.4
million ha of farmland. Farmers may `join’ an ESA scheme by signing a 10-year
agreement based on a plan which meets the conservation aims and objectives of
the particular ESA. In return for agreeing to these restrictions on activities,
farmers qualify for annual per hectare payments on two different levels: tier one
(aimed at the preservation of conservation features at existing levels) ; and tier
two (aimed at enhancement and extension of conservation features beyond
existing levels). ESAs thus involve the state paying farmers to produce environ-
mental public goods, in terms of wildlife and landscape quality, a notion which
® nds many echoes throughout the OECD (Hanley et al., 1998a).
This study was concerned with two ESAs, Breadalbane, in Highland
Perthshire , and The Machair of the Uists, Benbecula, Barra and Vatersay (`The
Machair’ , from now on) in the Western Isles. Breadalbane ESA comprises 179 284
ha of mountains and valley lands. Land cover features comprise grasslands,
heather moorland, wetlands, and birch and ash woodlands, with increasing
amounts of conifer plantation in upland areas. Farming is a mixture of upland
sheep and suckler cows plus intensive grassland cultivation on in-bye land. ESA
payments are conditional on the management of broadleaved and native wood-
lands, wetlands, herb rich pasture, heather moorland, dykes, hedges and archae-
ological features . The main objectives of the ESA programme are to conserve and
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on ® ve islands. Land cover includes grasslands, cultivated machair, dune
systems and rough pasture. Crofting activities are centred around small scale
crop and livestock production, and have resulted in high ¯ oristic diversity on
the machair lands. Rare breeding birds, such as the corncrake, are found in The
Machair, and the conservation requirements of the ESA programme here may be
thought of as an attempt to preserve and extend farming practices which result
in favourable conditions for these birds
2
and ¯ owers .
The ESA prescriptions will produce quite complex changes in ¯ ora, fauna and
landscape, and will also have implications for archaeological features not pro-
tected under existing legisla tion. Two stages were thus involved in developing
Information Packs to be used as part of the CVM survey: prediction of changes
to these features; and representation of these changes, in the form of with/with-
out scenarios.
With regard to prediction , the land area within each ESA was divided
up in to km
2
land class types, using the Institute of Terrestria l Ecology’ s
land classi® cation system (Institute for Terrestria l Ecology, 1991). This helped
the organization of environmental and land management data for each
ESA , and allowed the extrapolation of predicted conservation values across
each ESA. Classifying land in this way gave six major types for Breadalbane,
and two for The Machair. For each class, we predicted changes in land
cover resulting from changes in management (for example, from changes in
stocking rates or fertilizer use), using the National Vegetation Classi® cation
system for vegetative cover. Changes were predicted using succession models
(see Simpson e t al., 1997, for further details) . The impact of these likely
biological successions on the conservation status of each land class (in terms of
plant communities) was then assessed, using three criteria: biodiversity
(number of species m
2
); presence/absence of key indicator species; and relative
rarity of the NVZ community. These predictions were also discussed with
local agricultural advisors and farmers. Changes in bird numbers/species type
were predicted in consultation with the Royal Society for the Protection of
Birds, the Scottish Of® ce Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries Department,
and Scottish Natural Heritage. Changes in archaeological features were pre-
dicted in consultation with Historic Scotland. These changes were all then set
in the context of with and without the ESA prescriptions, by predicting likely
changes in the absence of the scheme. Representation of these predicted
changes was accomplished by producing Information Packs for each ESA.
These accompanied the CVM questionnaires, which gave background details
on the ESA scheme in general. Changes were shown as with and without
the ESA scheme in place, using colour photograph pairs which were
manipulated using Adobe Photoshop. For Breadalbane, changes to the
appearance of farmland and moorland, to archaeological features and to the
number and types of ¯ owers were included. For The Machair, changes to the
machair lands, birds, ¯ ower diversity, dunes and archaeological features were
portrayed.
In summary, the ESA scheme, if continued, will generate environmental
improvements in both areas relative to the `no ESA’ case. These improvements
are in terms of more attractive landscapes, the protection of rare and well-loved
birds and ¯ ora, and the protection of archaeological sites. Respondents learn
about what they are `buying ’ in the information packs, which use words and
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Respondents might therefore be reasonably expected to be very clear about the
change in the quantity of the environmental good which the survey addresses .
Design and Descriptive Results of the CVM Survey
An initial `attitudes’ survey of 150 respondents showed that income tax increases
were the second most preferred bid vehicle after entrance fees.
3
However,
entrance fees were rejected for the main survey bid vehicle as: (1) impractical,
due to the physical impossibility of excluding users from the areas; and (2) as
excluding non-use values. The attitudes survey also revealed that a majority of
the sample (70%) were in favour of farmers being paid by government to
produce both food and environmental outputs. Some 32% of the sample had
heard of the ESA programme, whilst 69% were in favour of paying for environ-
mental improvements in these areas. In subsequent focus groups, no objections
were made to the use of income tax as the preferred bid vehicle.
The target populations for the main survey were three-fold: the UK general
public; residents in the two ESAs, and visitors to each ESA. Focus groups
4
were
used to develop the wording and layout of the survey instruments (including
the Information Packs) and a pilot study was carried out prior to the main
survey. In genera l, the survey design follows NOAA guidelines, except that we
obtained both open-ended and dichotomous choice bid responses, as the latter
are well-known to result in higher WTP values than the former, due to
`yea-saying ’ and preference uncertainty ; and in that both mail-shot and in-per-
son interview responses were obtained. Response rates for the mail shot were
good by CVM standards, being greater than 50% in almost all sub-samples.
Respondents were repeatedly reminded that they were being asked their WTP
for the environmental improvements at one ESA only, and that extra spending
would be necessary for all other ESAs and for all other environmental policies.
No formal test of part-whole bias was incorporated in the open-ended CVM
design, although a test was included in the DC design .
Mean WTP in the open-ended sample for Breadalbane was £25.21 per house-
hold/year (95% ci 5 £19.06± £31.36), and £13.44 (95% ci 5 £10.10± £16.78) for The
Machair. The median WTP values were £10 and £1 respectively. Mean WTP was
thus higher for Breadalbane than for The Machair ESA, which may re¯ ect the
more specialist landscape and wildlife of The Machair areas. In both ESAs, WTP
declined with decreasing familiarity with the site: bids were highest for those
who had either lived in or visited the site; and lowest for those who had not
even heard of it before the survey.
5
Signi® cant non-use values were found, in
that those neither living in nor visiting the sites had positive WTP amounts
which were signi® cantly different from zero at the 95% con® dence level.
6
In both
ESAs, residents had a higher WTP than non-residents, although the difference is
never statistically signi® cant. Mail shot returns gave a higher mean WTP than
in-person interviews (for Breadalbane, £23.50 and £19.80 respectively), but this
difference is not statistically signi® cant in either ESA. For The Machair, in-per-
son interviews actually gave a slightly higher WTP value.
Several tests for reliability and validity were incorporated into the open-ended
CVM survey. First, a test± retest experiment was carried out. This procedure has
been adopted by several authors previously (see, for example, Kealy et al., 1990;
Loomis, 1990; Laughland et al., 1991; Bergland et al., 1996). It involves surveying
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elapsed, to check on what Berg land et al., refer to as the ª temporal stabilityº of
CVM estimates. Some debate exists on whether it is preferable to re-survey the
same individuals as in the main survey, or a different group drawn randomly
from the same population. The latter approach was used here, with 200 ques-
tionnaires being sent to a different random sample drawn from the general
public population three months after the main survey was completed. This
sample yielded a 45% response rate, with a mean WTP of £23.39 for Breadal-
bane. This is insigni® cantly different from the main survey result; median WTP
was identical in both samples. The test± retest procedure thus fails to reject the
null hypothesis of temporal stability in the open-ended CVM survey.
Second, a test of `scope’ was used, as recommended in the NOAA report. This
involves examining whether WTP is sensitive to the quantity of the environmen-
tal good being bid for. The null hypothesis is that mean WTP is increasing in the
quantity of the environmental good. Accordingly, a sub-sample of respondents
(n 5 220) were sent information packs on both ESAs, and asked their maximum
WTP for a programme to maintain the ESAs in both areas at once. This `double
information pack’ sub-sample is therefore expected to yield a higher mean WTP
than bids for either ESA in isolation. This was the result obtained. Mean WTP
for both ESAs valued together was higher at £36.00 than for either ESA when
valued alone (the relevant ® gures being £25.21 for Breadalbane and £13.44 for
The Machair). The null hypothesis cannot thus be rejected. However, WTP for
both ESAs combined is less than the sum of WTP for both ESAs valued
independently; this may be evidence of a nesting effect, brought about through
substitution possibilities.
Bid Curve Results
In this section, we illustrate the application of the econometric ideas discussed
earlier to the open-ended data sets from our CVM surveys. Table 1 shows the
distribution of the dependent variable for the two samples strati® ed by whether
or not the respondent reported their income. The Breadalbane sample consists of
302 respondents and The Machair sample consists of 358 respondents. In both
areas a substantial number of respondents did not report their income. More
speci® cally , in Breadalbane 274 respondents or 90.7% of the sample reported
their income. In The Machair the proportion of respondents reporting their
income was lowerÐ only 288 respondents or 80.4% of the sample.
With respect to the type of bid made (i.e. protest, zero or positive), Table 1
shows that 32.8% of responses in the Breadalbane sample and 25.1% of the
responses in The Machair sample were positive bids (see the last column in
Table 1). Likewise, genuine zero bids made up 21.5% and 25.1% of the responses
in the Breadalbane and Machair samples respectively. Finally, protest bids were
the most popular response, making up 45.7% and 49.7% of responses in the
Breadalbane and Machair samples, respectively. Protest bids were distinguished
from genuine zero bids by asking respondents why they were unwilling to pay
for the ESA programme. Those replying either that it was of no worth to them,
or that they could not afford it, were classi® ed as genuine zeros. Other re-
sponses, including non-responses, were classi® ed as protests. Those people who
answered that they ª did not knowº whether they would be willing to pay were
also classi® ed as protests. This is somewhat unusual in CVM, since such persons
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Table 1. Distribution of willingness to pay
responses
Income reported?




119 (43.4) 138 (45.7)
Zero 8 (28.6) 57 (20.8) 65 (21.5)
Positive 1 (3.6) 98 (35.8) 99 (32.8)
Total 28 274 302
Machair
Protest 36 (51.4) 142 (49.3) 178 (49.7)
Zero 22 (31.4) 68 (23.6) 90 (25.1)
Positive 12 (17.1) 78 (27.1) 90 (25.1)
Total 70 288 358
a
Percentages in parentheses.
protests. This leads to quite a high level of protesting in this study (compared,
for example, with ® gures of 6% ± 14% (Hanley & Milne , 1996); 6.5% (MacMillan
et al., 1996) and 22% (Hanley & Craig, 1991) in other UK open-ended CVM
studies). Removing these people and those giving no reason for their zero bid
gives lower protest rates Ð 33% for Breadalbane and 31% for The Machair. The
most popular reasons given for protesting were: ª People should not have to pay
for the programmeº (41 responses) and; ª Government should pay from lottery
fundsº (27 persons). We note that the proportion of positive bidders in the DC
design was much lower, at 6 ± 25% depending on sub-sample.
Table 1 also shows how the type of bid made varies w ith income non-re-
sponse. A comparison of the distributions between groups with respect to the
type of bid made provides some information that suggests there is a relation-
ship between income non-response and type of bid made. More speci® cally ,
comparing the column percentages in Table 1 indicates that respondents who
refuse to answer the income question appear to have a higher tendency to
report genuine zero and protest bids compared to respondents who report
their income (i.e. 96.4% compared to 64.2% in Breadalbane and 82.9% com-
pared to 72.9% in The Machair). Given the differences in these distributions, it
is unlikely that income non-reporters are a random sub-sample of all respon-
dents. This makes the explicit modelling of a selection process all the more
relevant here.
Table 2 presen ts the de® nitions and abbreviations of the variables used in the
bid curve analysis. These include socio-economic variables such as income and
age, survey-speci® c variables such as whether the response was obtained by
mail-shot or in-person interview , and preference/awareness information such as
whether the individual had visited the site in question. Of particular interest a
priori are: income; variables re¯ ecting the environmental preferences of the
individual (such as EnvGroup , LandPref and Envpref); and variables re¯ ecting the
degree of knowledge the individual has about the good in question (Heard and
Resident). It is common to see such variables used in bid curves , since they pick
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Table 2. Variable descriptions
Variable Description
Heard A dummy variable coded 1 if the individual has ever heard about the site but never visited
and coded 0 if otherwise.
Income Gross annual household income in pounds sterling.
Resident A dummy variable coded 1 if the individual is a resident of the area of the site and coded
0 otherwise.
England A dummy variable coded 1 if the individual resides in England and coded 0 otherwise
(i.e. Scotland).
Age The age of the individual in years.
Mail A dummy variable coded 1 if the individual was interviewed via a mail-shot and coded
0 otherwise (i.e. in personal interview ).
Visit A dummy variable coded 1 if the individual has visited the site before and coded zero
if otherwise.
LandPref Rank order score of preference measure relating to the ª importance of protecting
landscapeº (see text).
EnvPre f Rank order score of preference measure relating to the ª importance of protecting
environment and countrysideº (see text).
AnimPre f Rank order score of preference measure relating to the ª importance of protecting rare
animals and plantsº (see text).
HistPref Rank order score of preference measure relating to the ª importance of protecting
historical sitesº (see text).
AccessPref Rank order score of preference measure relating to the ª importance of ensuring public
access to the countrysideº (see text).
EnvGroup Number of environmental groups of which the individual is a member.
environmental improvements. By including such variables in the bid curve, it is
possible to test whether, on statistical signi® cance grounds, this is indeed so.
Finally, survey design dummy variables are often also included to test for design
effects; here, the only design effect tested for is the effect of collecting data from
mail shots as opposed to in-person surveys (Mail).
Table 3 shows means and standard deviations for the variables listed in
Table 2. For each ESA there are three columns. The third column (i.e. (3)
and (6)) reports the descriptive statistics for all respondents, regardless of
whether or not they reported their income (note therefore that no mean or
standard deviation is reported for the income variable). The second column
(i.e. (2) and (5)) shows the descriptive statistics for only those respondents
who reported their income (i.e. income non-respondents are excluded in
the calculation of the summary statistics). Finally , the ® rst column (i.e. (1)
and (4)) shows the descriptive statistics for those respondents who reported
their income and made genuine zero or positive bids (i.e. income non-respon-
dents and protest bidders are excluded). The key point to note about th is
table is that comparing across the columns reveals that, for many of the
variables, these summary statistics are quite different, which suggests further
that income non-reporting and protest bidding is like ly not a random
process.
Table 4 reports estimates of the bid curves using different methods. Note that
these equations exclude the environmental preference variables included in the
selection equation, since we have chosen to specify these as in¯ uencing the
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positive WTP bids. The table shows the estimated parameters, along with the
ratio of the parameters to their standard errors : s is the scale parameter of the
Tobit model; r is the correlation between the errors in the selection equation (not
reported here) and the bid curve. Note that the selection equation and the Tobit
models are in practice estimated jointly; to avoid confusion we report only the
latter. For the Tobit models, the R
2
values are likelihood ratio based pseudo-R
2
values.
For each region, there are four columns of estimates. The ® rst column (i.e. (1)
and (5)) is an OLS equation estimated using information on only those respon-
dents who tender a genuine zero or positive bid and report their income. That
is, no information relating to protest bidding and income non-reporting is
included in the estimation of the bid curve. In this sense , the ® rst column
illustrates the most common way that bid curves are estimated. The second
column (i.e. (2) and (6)) is a Tobit equation estimated using the same sample.
The only difference therefore between the ® rst and second column is that
information relating to the censoring at zero is used in the estimation of the bid
curve. The third column (i.e. (3) and (7)) is a Tobit model with sample selection
which includes those respondents who tender protest bids in the estimation but
excludes those respondents who do not report their income. In this model,
information on income non-reporting is not included in the estimation of the bid
curve. Finally, the fourth column (i.e. (4) and (8)) is a Tobit model with sample
selection which includes both those respondents who tender protest bids and
those respondents who do not report their income in the estimation. Therefore,
this model uses information relating to both income non-reporting and protest
bidding to assist in the estimation of the bid curve, and is the `full information’
version of our competing models.
7
Although the parameters of the OLS and Tobit equations are not directly
comparable, there are distinct d ifferences with respect to the sign i® cance of
some of the included explanatory variables. For example, for Breadalbane,
residence in the ESA (Resident), age (Age) and awareness of the ESA before the
survey (Heard) are statistically signi® cant at conventional levels in the Tobit
equation but are not signi® cant in the OLS equation (see columns (1) and (2)).
L ikewise, for The Machair, being a resident of England (England), as opposed
to Scotland, is statistically sign i® cant in the OLS equation but not in any of the
Tobit equations. The distinction between whether responses were collected by
mail shot or by face-to-face interview (Mail) is shown to be statistically
insigni® cant: given the reasonable response rates also achieved for the mail
shot, th is perhaps suggests that the NOAA panel recommendation against
using mail shots should be reconsidered , given a well-designed and produced
survey instrument.
Comparing across the columns of Tobit estimates in Table 4 suggests that
income is the most important determinant of willingness to pay. In all the Tobit
equations, the income variable (Income) is highly statistically signi® cant (1% level
or below). This is especially the case for The Machair, where few of the other
included explanatory variables achieve statistical signi® cance, even at the gener-
ous 10% level. It is also important to note that, for both The Machair and
Breadalbane, the parameter on income increases when the simple OLS model is
compared with the full-information Tobit model with selection: this effect is
much larger for the Machair than for Breadalbane, doubling the parameter in the
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Table 5. Macdonald ± Mof® tt Tobit decomposition
(3) (4)
Percentage of Percentage of
(1) (2) mean total mean total
Decomposition Percentage of Mean response due to response due to
based on sample above total response below response above
equation no. limit response limit limit
A. All variables
Breadalbane
(2) 63.2 57.7 40.8 59.2
(3) 63.2 65.0 45.6 54.4
(4) 63.2 66.8 46.9 53.1
The Machair
(6) 53.4 49.6 36.1 63.9
(7) 53.4 66.5 46.6 53.4
(8) 53.4 67.8 47.6 52.4
B. Income
Breadalbane
(2) 63.2 65.1 45.6 54.4
(3) 63.2 64.4 45.2 54.8
(4) 63.2 62.6 43.9 56.1
The Machair
(6) 53.4 62.9 44.1 55.9
(7) 53.4 60.1 42.3 57.7
(8) 53.4 61.5 43.2 56.8
Note : See text for further discussion of these calculations.
Finally , Table 5 shows the McDonald & Mof® tt decomposition of the Tobit
results. As discussed above, this procedure decomposes the impact of a marginal
change in, say, income into two components. The ® rst component is the impact
of a variable or a combination of variables on the probability of tendering a
positive bid (column (3)). The second component is the impact on the magnitude
of WTP, given the decision to bid positive (column (4)). The upper panel of Table
5 shows the decomposition for an equi-marginal change in all dependent
variables, when they are initially set at their mean values. The lower panel
shows the effect of changing income alone, holding all other right-hand side
variables constant.
Consider ing panel A ® rst, it may be noted that the breakdown of the overall
response of WTP is roughly consistent across all six models, in that approxi-
mately 45% of the effect takes place on the probability of being a positive bidder,
whilst about 55% of the effect is on the amount people are willing to pay once
they have decided to pay something. Panel B shows that this pattern holds for
the case when income alone is changed . This shows that simply interpreting the
income coef® cient in the Tobit model of WTP would lead to over-estimating
elasticities (de® ned as the percentage increase in positive WTP for any individ-
ual due to a 1% increase in income) by around 45%. By way of example, for The
Machair, the estimated elasticity of WTP with respect to income is 1 0.87 based
on the Tobit model (Table 4, column (8)). Allowing for the decomposition, this
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model (column (4)) is lower at 1 0.43 once the decomposition has been allowed
for, since not decomposing the parameter would increase the elasticity to
1 0.773.
Conclusions
In this paper we have considered two econometric issues in the estimation of
bid curves from CVM surveys. One is concerned with selection: that the
formulation of w illingness to pay amounts is correctly modelled in a nested
fashion , using selection models. Selection occurs when respondents decide
whether to protest or else tender a genuine zero or positive bid. Selection can
also be used to take account of the fact that income is a missing observation
for a number of respondents, due to a non-random pattern of income non-re-
porting on estimation. That WTP is also a censored variable needs to be
incorporated in to the model too. Second, we showed how the parameter
estimates that emerge from Tobit modelling can be decomposed into effects on
the probability of being a positive bidder, and the size of WTP for such
positive bidders. Neglecting this decomposition could lead analysts to over-es-
timate income elasticities (and does in our empirical example). Whilst the
impact of specifying a selection model rather than a simple OLS model is not
very great for the data set used in th is paper, this does not of course mean that
th is w ill be so for other data sets.
This paper has also been about the application of CVM to one aspect of
agri-environmental policy in the UK, namely the ESA scheme. Previous CVM
analyses of other UK ESAs (for example, Willis et al., 1993; Gourlay, 1996;
Bullock & Kay, 1996) have also found that users and non-users were WTP
signi® cant amounts for similar environmental bene ® ts. For example, Willis e t
al., found that residents had a mean WTP of £27.52/household/year for the
South Downs ESA and £17.53 for the Somerset Levels ESA; whilst Gourlay
found a residents’ mean WTP of £20.60/household/year for Loch Lomond
ESA , and £13.00 for Stewartry ESA. These ® gures, all obtained using OE
designs, are very comparable to the estimates obtained here for Breadalbane
and The Machair. Referring to Breadalbane and The Machair speci® cally , then
aggregating over just residents and estimated visitors, reveals a total bene ® t
® gure in each case well in excess of programme costs.
9
For Breadalbane, th is
(residents plus visitors) total bene ® t is £1.046 million/year; for The Machair, it
is £329 790/year. Thus, on cost± bene ® t analysis grounds, there is a good case
for main taining the ESA programme in both these areas, even if the very large
non-use values associated with them are ignored. Including non-use values
greatly increases total WTP, since the sample was drawn from the entire
population of the UK. This paper migh t be seen, then, as providing further
evidence of the economic desirability , on ef® ciency grounds, of aspects of EU
agri-environmental policy.
Finally , one might ask what implications the paper has for the design of future
CVM studies. We suggest that data collection and subsequent modelling needs
to be extended so that the analyst can explain: (1) what determines whether an
individual is able to answer the WTP question at all; (2) what determines
whether they protest, or else tender a genuine zero or positive bid; (3) assuming
they do not protest, what determines whether they tender a positive bid or a
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high this bid is. This implies deciding at an early stage to collect data which can
address each part of this value formulation/statement process, for example data
on ethical beliefs with regard to protesting. Much bid curve analysis in CVM is
aimed solely at question (4), with positive bids only being used in the regression
(this is especially likely if the popular semi-log (dependent) functional form is
speci® ed). Allowing genuine zeros along with positive bids in an OLS frame-
work will not, however, answer any of the other three questions. Selection
models seem a promising way forwards in this regard. and might be compared
with the nested multi-nomial logit models now becoming popular in recreational
demand studies using random utility approaches. In addition, the decompo-
sition we have suggested allows for more accurate measures of the income
elasticity of demand for environmental goods.
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Notes
1. NOAA is the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, the body respon-
sible for implementing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This duty led NOAA to commission a
well-known report on whether CVM was suitable for estimating environmental damage which
could become part of a law suit; the report resulted in a set of guidelines for the design and
implementation of CVM in the US (Arrow et al., 1993).
2. Other rare birds predicted to bene® t from the ESA in The Machair include corn bunting, red
necked phalarope and arctic terns.
3. Other bid vehicles considered in the attitudes survey were payments to a trust fund, and higher
food prices.
4. Focus groups were conducted in Aberdeen, Stirling, Dunblane, Dundee , Aberfe ldy and Killin,
giving 10 groups in all. Each group comprised no more than 10 people. Participants were paid
£15 each for completing a one-hour session, which involved taped discussions of all materials
being produced for the surveys.
5. It may seem odd to refer to a WTP for those who had not heard of the site before receiving the
questionnaire. However, as Bishop & Welsh (1994) have noted, such unawareness does not in
itself mean that non-use values do not exist, since a good which respondents were previously
unaware of still has the potential to satisfy preferences.
6. All references to `statistical signi® cance ’ in this paper refer to a 95% con® dence level unless
otherwise stated.
7. One problem with the Tobit model is that it tends not to be robust to violations of the underlying
distributional assumptions. In light of this, tests for heteroscedasticity and normality were
carried out. First, cond itional moment based tests for normality suggested by Pagan & Vella
(1989) were carried out, and these tests reject normality. Second, multiplicative tests for
heteroscedasticity were carried, and these tests reject homoscedasticity. Therefore , the estimated
parameters summarized in Table 4 are inef® cient since the variances of the parameters will be
biased.
8. Assuming a mean bid of £13.30 and a mean income level of £18 048.
9. Programme costs will, in any case, over-estimate resource costs, since they include transfer
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